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THE ONLY GOOD POOR WOMAN: 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND WELFARE 
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS * 
The goal of some welfare reform proposals is to discourage poor women 
from having children. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides a 
ready device for challenging these proposals in court. Such challenges, howev-
er, invoke a particular tension in the use of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine in the context of welfare-the tension between seeking to protect the 
private decisions of welfare recipients while at the same time seeking to ob-
tain public assistance for exercising those decisions. This tension stems partly 
from the doctrine's attempt to preserve poor people's liberty within a constitu-
tional framework designed to protect only property owners. 1 
The Supreme Court has often resolved this tension by failing to find a 
constitutional violation when the government conditions welfare benefits on 
the waiver of privacy rights.2 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine may 
nevertheless appear to be the indispensable cornerstone of claims that new 
welfare regulations violate recipients' right to reproductive autonomy. 3 I argue 
* Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. B.A., Yale Universi ty, 1977; J.D., 
Harvard Law School, 1980. This article benefitted from conversations with Marion Smiley and 
Lucie White; from comments of participants at the symposium on the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions at the University of Denver College of Law, the Class and Reproductive Control panel 
at the Crit Networks Conference on Class & Identity, and the symposium on Welfare As We 'd 
Like It To Be at Princeton University; and from discussions with Lucie White's Social Welfare 
Law class at Harvard Law School and the Harvard University Prograrn in Ethics and t.t1e Profes-
sions seminar. I am grateful to the Program in Ethics and the Professions for its research support. 
1. Thus, this tension does not arise in the Supreme Court's application of the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine in cases involving property rights , which may explain why property 
owners appear to prevail more often L1an welfare recipients. Compare, e.g. , Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (extending the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to in validate, 
under the Takings Clause, a city 's attempt to condition the grant of a discretionary building permit 
on the donation of property to the government) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S . 398 (1963) 
(holding that the denial of unemployment benefits to persons who refuse to work on Saturdays for 
religious reasons violates the First Amendment) with Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 
360 (1988) (holding denial of food stamps to strikers does not violate the First Ame ndment) and 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding denial of medical benefits for abm1ion but not 
childbirth). See also Thomas W. Merriil, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public 
Goods, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 859 (1995) (using a model of constitutional rights as public goods to 
explain the Court's holding in Dolan) . Merrill suggests tha t t.J'Je Court rej t:cted i'il~dicaicl 
recipients ' unconstitutional conditions claim in Lhe abortion funding cases because "the judiciary 
views the right to abortion, which after all is grounded in the ' right to pri vacy,' 2.s a uniquely pri-
vate right whose primary significarJce is to l.!1e individual exercising that right." !d. at 875. 
2. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S . 587 (1987); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S . '!-M (1977) . 
3. See, e.g., Laurence C. Nolan. The Unconstitut ional Conditions Doctrine and iHcndctir:g 
Norp/antfor Wom en on Welfare Discourse , 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 15 (1994): David S . Coale , 
Note, Norplant Bonuses and The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 71 TE:<. L. R:=:·;. 189 
(1992). In the face of conservative proposals to abai1don the unconstitutiona' cc·:1ditions dcctri ;·,,~ 
in order to allow the sta te greater po1ver to require citizens to trade their consticui.ionc.l rights fc!' 
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in this article that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine offers an impaired 
defense against welfare policies that regulate poor women's reproduction. 
Although these policies reflect an unjust understanding of the reproductive 
liberties of women on welfare, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine cannot 
adequately explain why. We should replace it with a vision of welfare that 
more affirmatively reconciles the protection of poor women's privacy with the 
demand for public suppmi.4 
I. CONTRACEPTIVE WELFARE PROPOSALS 
Welfare reform measures designed to discourage reproduction by recipi-
ents (I will call them contraceptive welfare proposals or laws) are based on the 
belief that welfare encourages poor women to bear children, combined with 
taxpayer resentment for having to pay to support them. As Representative 
Marge Roukema asked during the congressional debate on the Family Support 
Act, "how much longer do you think the two-worker couple will tolerate the 
welfare state and its cost to them in taxes to support that welfare mother? ... 
The answer is that they should not have to. "5 \Velfare mothers' procreation is 
also considered morally irresponsible according !o the premise that people 
should only have children they can afford to support.6 Welfare reform rhetoric 
describes childbeaTing by the poor as fueling a cycle of poverty by producing 
children who wi ll inevitably depend on the government for sustenance.7 
Sometimes reproduction by particular poor mothers, such as those who are 
unmarried or teenagers, is singied out as the target for deterrence.8 
public benefits, it is understandable that liberals anJ progressives would seek to shore up the 
doctrine. See, e.g., RiCHARD EPSTEIN, B ARGAlNING 'hlTH THI': STATE (1993) (arguiilg that abolish-
ing the unconstitutional conditioilS doctrine would promote economic efficiency). 
4. This article expands my critique of t~e unconstitutional conclir.iom: doctrine in the context 
of public assistance and First Amendment right~. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. SullivaJ> w1d the 
Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 587 ( 1993). 
5. 113 CONG. REC. H 11 ,5 15 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1937) (statement of Rep. Rouke ma). 
6. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETH1Nl'.JNG SGC!AL POUCY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE 
UNDER CLASS 189-90 ( 1992) (discussing middle-class American norms about childbearing that the 
"reproductive underclass" ·,t iolates). 
7. See, e.g., lVllCKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY 121 (1992); LAWRENCE M. M E.W, THE 
NEW POLmCs OF POVE?..T'{: THE NONWORlUNG POOR IN AMER!CA (1992); CHARLES MURRAY, 
LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 154-66 (1984). I discuss the fallacy o f all 
of these premises elsewhere. See Dorothy E. Roberts, hratiorwlity a,uf Sacrifice in the Welfare 
Reform Consensus, 81 U. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming i 995) . 
8. The House Republica.11s' Personal Responsibility Act, for example, contains measures 
designed to discourage unwed teenagers from btcorning mothers. It prohibits mothers under t.t'1e 
age of 18 from i·eceiving ;\FDC benefits for children born out of wedlock. regardless of when aid 
is sought for the child, unless the mother marries t.t'le child's faL1e!· or someone who adopts u'1e 
child. Personal Res;x:nsib iiity Act, H.rr. 4, i 04th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 OS (1995) (here inafter Per-
sona1 Responsi bility .Act]. (A_n arncndrncnt to the House bill V·/O:..dd all o'.-V teenage molhers to re-
ceive I\~1edic;:jd, focd sL::tinps~ and voechefs to pay for iten1s ":--;eitabi.;; for L'1e care of tht~ child." 
Mireya Navarro, Threat :Jf a Benefit s Cuwff" Willli Deter Pregnancies?, N.Y. TilvfES, Apr. 17, 
1995 .) 'TI1e LA.ct &.lso denies aid fo r children Vlhose paternity is not est~blished 3.rld requires s tates 
to warn a preg.n~~n i"~ un1na:. riecl v¥· on1an of l1er ir:eligibi lity fur goverft£nent a.id un:es5 she 1l1for:ns 
u'1e state of ti1e prospec·tiv-e f:-E.her ' :; !d~.::n!.i ty ::~nd cooperate::; ln estaiJiishing the child 1S pate rnity. 
Persc.nai :RespCilsibility .1\ ct~ suprc. , §§ 10 l, 103 . AJtbough tb]s pr:y;i sivn is airned at establishing 
paternity t.~s e8_dy as po:;sible, it rnigh t also p:.-ovidt.~ 8..!.1 inceTn::·'/e to pc.o~- prcg!la.nt \vornen to g::::t an 
c.bortion. St·:: Ste ·i e [ :aley & Carol J,'Juzcitis) b-;O lJ.!;e Vo;~s t·:} I:..~ c!s£ Vl.::(far-2 C\tts; Abon'ion ~,;:;-oes 
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This perception of procreation by the poor as costly 3.JJ.d pathological was 
most notably promoted by Charles Murray, who, in 1984, argued that welfare 
induces poor women to have babies;9 in 1993, declared that "illegitimacy is 
the single most important social problem of our time; " 10 and in 1994, claimed 
that the higher fertility rates of groups with lower average intelligence, who 
fall at the bottom of the economic ladder, help to perpetuate welfare depen-
dency.11 Wnile his views were once considered on the political fringe, 
Murray now "has a platform in respectable publications and is welcomed as a 
savant by Republicans in Congress." 12 These themes run throughout the 
House Republicans' proposed Personal Responsibility Act. 13 The bottom line 
of this thin.ung is that, since reproduction by the poor perpetuates poverty, 
policies designed to stem their reproduction are an efficient means of at once 
reducing poverty and cutting welfare costs. 
The government can take several avenues to achieve the goal of reducing 
the number of children born to women on welfare. The most benign is to 
make contraceptives freely available to welfare recipients. Every state now 
ma.\:es Norp1ant available to poor women through Medicaid. 14 This approach 
might be combined with the added incentive of offering a cash bonus to wom-
en on welfare for using Norplant. Several state legislatures have considered 
implementing such a bonus progr2.m.15 A third option is to deny additional 
benefits for children born to women who are already receiving public assis-
tance. If the belief that welfare encourages childbirth were accurate, denying 
benefits would remove the incentive for women to become pregnant, or at 
least make childbearing more burdensome. Children bom despite the elimi-
nation of incentives would be the unfortunate casualties of this detenence 
rationale. Several states already have enacted so-called weifare "fam ily caps," 
and others are considering such legislation.16 
Win Concession. O n . T RIB., Mar. 23, 1995, at l (discussing Roman Catholics' and anti-abortion 
Repub1icar1s' concern that the Act 's provisions designed to reduce out-of-wedlock bi::J.hs will en-
courage pregnant women to obtain abortions); Rotert Pear, Ca tholic Bishops C"hal!enge Pieces of 
Welfare Bill, N.Y. TIMES, lv.!ar. 19, i995, at 1 (same). 
9. See MURRAY, supra note 7, at 154-66. 
10. See Charles Murray, Th e Coming White Undercla.ss, 'NALL ST. J. , Oct. 29, 1993, at A1 4. 
11. See R;Ci-l.AR D j. HERRNSTEIN & C HARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: l NTELUGENCE 
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN A MERIC AN LIFE ( 1994). 
12. Paul Starr, Who Owns th!! Future? , T HE AI>IEPJCAt'-l P ROSPECT, Spri ng 1995, at 6. 
13. The preamble of the Personal Responsibi!iry Act states that the Ac t's purpose is to " re-
store the American fa_rnily, reduce illegitimacy. control welfare spending ~J1d red uce welfare de-
pendence." Sec Personal Responsibility Act, supm note 8. 
14. Tcnn Bethell , Norplant is Welfare State ' s New Opiate: Contraceptive Doesn't Address 
Causes of !llegitimate Births , L.A. TlMES. Jan . 24, 1993, at tvi5; see aiso T?j\l ;>J Lev•in, 5- Year 
Contraceptive lmpi.ani Seems Headed f!r W ide Use, N.Y. Tl MES , Nov. 29, 1991, at A l. This 
policy is not devoid of compulsio!1. how¢ver. if tl1c state provides !·forplant but 110t other types of 
contr?.ception. 
15. See lCAN. H.B. 1089, 7~-::..:~l Leg., 2d .Sess. (1991 ) (providii1g ';),:omen receiving At!::TIC a 
$500 cash bonus for in~ening I'·~orph!nt) as v,-eli as L1I1 additional $50 each year for coDtinued use); 
L.<'l~. H. B. 1 58 4~ l7 th P.. Sess. S }(~) (1 99 1) (cnvardix;g \vornen on \velf:JTe SIOO per year fer using 
l~~ orp1a.nt) ; 'I'EI,n-L l-1.8 . 1850 _, 97!.~1 Leg ., 2cl. Sess. (1992) (same) . 
1r. See iVh_ke Dorning ~ :-llelfa;r.:; C'ups Tr_/ t ·J .Put Lid ::;n 3ize cf i-r:·an!ilizs: CHL TRiB ., r.;Iar. 
12, 1995~ at l: iVieli:1d8. f-Ie n.nebe :~· ger~ .t?.erh£nki.:-tg 1-Yelfare: .Deterri."1g 1;.!ew Birth:;- A Spzciaf Re-
port: Si'aie Aid is C:7..ppEti , b:~:r to :vh(:_t Effect?) f·!. ~{. l"'IIvfES, A.pr. 11, 1995, 2t />:.. J. The P·::rsonal 
R~sp0!1Sib~lity A.c:~ de·r: ~e- ~ : . ~. FJ.)~~_' ~: c;"l:~. fi t:~ ror ;.·.Gd i ~ it) r:2. l c h.i ld..!-.~n bon1 t;) .:'~FDC "fec~.p ] en ts c.r to 
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A fourth possibility is to use more coercive means to ensure that women 
receiving government aid remain infertile. Mandating sterilization of women 
on welfare, a strategy used in many states during the first half of the twentieth 
century, now seems to be politically unacceptable. 17 But the public might be 
willing to impose less permanent methods of regulating poor women 's fertility. 
Nm-plant serves this purpose adeptly because it acts on a long term basis and 
is reversible. At the same time, since removal requires a minor surgical proce-
dure, it is possible for government authorities to monitor its use. Unlike most 
other contraceptives, Norplant ' s effectiveness does not depend on a woman's 
constant cooperation. At least two states have proposed legislation to mandate 
the use of Norplant as a condition of receiving welfare benefits.18 Denying 
benefits for children born to women on welfare has been condemned by many 
as cruel to the innocent children who are punished for their mothers' behav-
ior.19 A rule requiring Norplant as a condition of receiving welfare avoids 
this discomfort, since its objective is to prevent the birth of the children in the 
first place. (Of course, children whose mothers refuse to accept the condition 
will lose their benefits.) Americans are predisposed to be less concerned about 
protecting the reproductive decisions of poor women than the welfare of their 
children. As policymac~ers become increasingly hostile towards poor mothers 
on welfare, it is likely that these more coercive proposals will proliferate and 
may even prevail.20 
U. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS PROBLEM 
It is clear at the outset that contraceptive welfare laws present an uncon-
stitutional conditions problem. They raise the classic unconstitutional condi-
anyone who received A."CDC at a11y time during the 10-month period ending with the birth of the 
child. Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 8, § 106. Supreme Court precedents impose no 
obligation on t.'le government to pay women on welfare benefits to support their additional chil-
dren. See Dar1dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that a state AFDC program provi-
sion imposing a maximum E"Jonthly grant per fami ly did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); 
see also Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 129 1 (1995) (holding that federal AFDC regulations do 
not prohibit states from grouping into a single "assistance unit" all needy children living in the 
san1e household under the care of one relative even though this rule results in a decrease in maxi-
mum per capita AFDC benefits). 
17. On tbe other hand, the popularity of tubal ligation and vasectomy as a method of family 
pl2jming may have diminished the public 's concern about the brutality of coercing these proce-
dures . P HILLI? P. REILLY , The SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION 
INTI-IE U NTIED STATES 161 (199 1) . In 1980, the chairman of the Texas Board of Resources pro-
posed steri lizing v;elfare recipients in the state. Ojj'icial Urges Sterilization of Texas Welfare Re-
cipients , N.Y. TI!viES , Feb. 28, 1980; see also Jim Simon, Heavy Hand of Welfare Reform Legisla-
tors Planning to Get Tough, SEATrLE TIMES , Jan. 31, 1992, at B 1 (discussing Washington state 
senator Scott Barr' s proposal to offer $ 10,000 bonuses to welfare mothers who agree to steriliza-
tion after the birt}: of their firs t child) . 
18. See S.B. 2895, Miss. (1992); H.B. 3207, S.C. (1993). 
i9. h son De?arle, Despising Welfare, P itying Its Young, N. Y. TlMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at 5. 
20 . A Newsweek arlicle reported in 1993 Lhat " legislators in 13 states have proposed nearly 
twc· doz.c; ;·; oills d-·?.t <J. im to use Ncrpla.nt as an ins trument of social policy." Barbara Kantrowitz & 
? at Wi:Jger<. Th ::: Norplcmt Deba!e, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 36; see genera lly Madeline 
Benl::y, J:::omment, The Cr.?ation and Perpew..a tion of ihe iYJother!Body Myth: Judicia l and Leg is-
iarive En!is tllJ~l!!' ofil/orplo.nt , 41 B UFF. L. REV. 703, 731-58 (1 993) (sur<eying legislative initia-
t.i_,/eS "C:/ i~tg ·;;::.1f0.r-:: to Nol-p1aJ1t). 
t 
I 
; 
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tions question whether the government may condition the conferral of welfare 
benefits on the benef1ciary's surrender of her constitutional right to reproduc-
tive autonomy and bodily integrity, although the govemment might choose not 
to provide welfare benefits altogether. The government is plainly doing in-
directly what it could not do directly. 
Few would dispute that it would be unconstitutional-at least under cur-
rent conditions- for a state to pass a law requi1ing women to use contracep-
tives.21 The concept of decisional privacy, which seeks to protect intimate or 
personal a.ffairs that are fundamental to an individual's identity and moral 
personhood from unjustified government intrusion, is firmly established. 22 
Freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life has been at 
the forefront of the development of the right of privacy .23 Considerable sup-
port exists for the conclusion that the decision to procreate is part of the right 
of privacy. 24 The decision to bear children is universally acknowledged in the 
privacy cases as being "at the very heart" of these constitutionally protected 
choices.25 The Court expressed the constitutional importance of the right to 
procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma., declaring the right to bear children "one of 
the basic civil rights of man."26 
The right of privacy, then, pwtects both the choice to bear children and 
the choice to refrain from bearing them. Unjustifiably burdening either choice 
violates a woman's personJ10od by denying her autonomy over the self-defin-
ing decision of whether she will bring another being into the world. Requiring 
women to use contraceptives is, in this sense, just as pernicious as forced ma-
ternity at the behest of the state. ln addition, mandating such an invasive pro-
cedure as Norplant insertion '.vould violate women's due process rights to 
bodily integrity J.nd to refuse medical treatment.27 Since states could not con-
stitutionally pass laws directly mandating that women use Norplant, the argu-
--------·-------------
21. Nev.~rL'leless, LaJTf Alexamie!· did dispute this assertion at the symposium, arguing that 
there is no absolute righ< to procreate. Although the Constitution does no t protect the right to 
procreate absolutely, in thc.t the right might be uven~om~ by a cornp~Hing state interest, it does 
safeguard i.i1dividuals ' procreative decisions from government interference. Aiexander proposed a 
limited ;·ight to procreate if one is firm:cially able to support one 's children . A hypothetical law 
directly limiting procreation on the basis of wealtl1 illustra<es that this con,:eption of Lhe right to 
procreate is too nc.rrow. A ciiminal stc.tute punishing individuals for havi ng children without eco-
nomic means to support them or a legislative scheme granting pMenting licenses only to individ-
uals \vho rnet fina.ncisl sto_nda.rds \v ould :lt least rc.isc consti::-utioncJ concern . 
22. See genzrall_'/ LA1JRENCE :t. 'TRJBE, 1\.lvfERIC/;_"i C ONSTITIITlOHAL L.'\Vi § 15-10 (2d ed . 
1988); Jed Rubenfeld, The R.:gh! of Pri :J ri.C';' ~ 102 fu\.R'/. L. P~v . 737 (1989). 
23 . See , e.g., Rce v. \Vade ~ 410 U.S . 113 (1973) (right to choose v/het.~er to terrninate a 
pregnancy); Cris,,;vold v. Conn-~c -~icu.t. 331 1J.S . .: ~/ 9 (J965) (right to decide \Vhe ther to use contra-
ceptives). 
24. See gEnerally JOHN A~. R OBERTSON, r,::HTLD9..EN OC CHO:C"S: .Fr-..EEDOi··{ AND THE f<lEVv' RE-
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (199-\j . 
25. Car,:;:' v. ?opulaiion S-:-l-"'-.3. IJ1t' l, 431 ·u.s. 6'7S; rS BS (1977) ; set: .:.-;/:::·c -~~isenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, t~53 ( 1972) ('(If ~.l ; . .::; rLs'ni. of pri "ll ~J:y n1e~·ns c.ny!tL~ ~t 6~ i ~: :3 tJ! ~ 1·igh;: c{ the individual, 
tnarried or single , to be fr~·~ .frorn UEY-rEr.r::lnt:::d gov;:rn..lT!eD~al i!-:trus.ioi! in ~o rnatt;_:rs so :fEndarnen-
tally ~.ffecting a persc·n RS til·~ d-ecision N;.1et"h<::r to bec~I o.~ - t.cge.t ::1 child .. ") . 
note 3 ~ :;: t 2C 5---CB. 
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ment goes, they cannot achieve this end indirectly by conditioning welfare 
payments on Norplant use. 
This articulation of the unconstitutional conditions argument does not 
guarantee the invalidation of contraceptive welfare laws. The Supreme Court 
has avoided the unconstitutional conditions problem by distinguishing between 
direct state interference vvith a protected activity and the state's mere refusal to 
subsidize a protected activity. The former, the Court concedes, raises a consti-
tutional issue because it involves state action, whereas it characterizes the 
latter as a constitutionally insignificant failure to act. Embedded in this distinc-
tion is the prevalent understanding of constitutional protections that extends 
only to the individual's negative right to be free from unjustified state intru-
sion and that measures state action from a baseline of the current arrangements 
of wealth and privilege.28 Under this reasoning, it is possible to characterize a 
condition on benefits as a constitutional nonsubsidy rather than an unconstitu-
tional penalty. 
The Court's most developed articulation of this doctrinal sleight of hand 
can be found in a series of cases concerning the government's obligation to 
subsidize the reproductive decisions of poor women. In these cases, the Court 
refused to require the state or federal government to pay for the cost of abor-
tion services for poor women, even though the government pays for the ex-
penses incident to childbirth.29 The abortion funding cases raise an unconsti-
tutional conditions problem when the government's refusal to pay for abor-
tions is viewed as a condition on the receipt of Medicaid funds-pregnant 
women may receive medical benefits as long as they do not use them to exer-
cise their right to obtain :m abortion. The Court nevertheless upheld this condi-
tion , reasoning, 
[a]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a 
woman's choice, it need not remove those not of its own cre-
ation .... [I]t simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of 
choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial 
resources to avail herseif o:f the fu1l range of protected choices.30 
Can the government claim, as it did successfully in the abortion-funding 
cases, that by conditioning weifare payments on birth contr:)l it is not prevent-
ing welfare recipients from exercis ing their reproductive rights? The answer 
may depend on which type of contraceptive law is at issue . Unlike the laws in 
the abortion--funding c<:ls~s , Norplant mandates impose more than the require-
ment that we1fare funds be spent en the purpose for which they were intend-
ed--child care and not child bearing . They do not just fail to provide funds for 
an nctiv\ty; mth<:r, ti .ey require that v.;e}fare recipients undergo an affirrna-
tive---ill"ld invasive---procedure . Women vvho agree to the condition in order to 
rece1\'e A~.FDC~ payrnents do not have the opt1on of exercising their constitu-
28 . 5:'e .; ~r\3S P .. s·u ~··iSTEU'-1 ) ~THE P.~l;.TY.AL CONSTITUT:ON (1993) ; David /\. Straus~, DL-te Pro-
·:.:.:?. S£:: Rust'.'. Sulliv&li , 500 U.3 . 173 (1 991); \Veb~~~er v . .P..eprodu:: tiv,:; 1-lealth Servs., 492 
U.S. 41)i_) ( l 98S\): I--~ ;uTis 'I . 1\'i c ·?~c~e , -<-t;.8 U.S. 2.97 ( l9SO;.; ?·,1 2.}; --:r v. Rc:::, 432 U.S. t~-64 ( 1977). 
J ~:_) . i lc.xris ·,;. J\'k.:28.e , '-t<-8 t J . .S . 297 (19gQ) . 
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tiona! right to procreate through private means. The government's condition of 
Norplant insertion completely forecloses their reproductive choice. Conversely, 
women who wish to exercise their right to procreate, and therefore refuse to 
use Norplant, must pay the high price of losing their benefits. 3 1 
In contrast, it would be more plausible for the state to claim that offering 
cash bonuses for Norplant use implements a legitimate decision to fund birth 
control and not childbirth. Recipients might counter that the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine forbids bonus programs because they make indigent wom-
en pay more than wealthier women-the cost of forgoing the bonus-to exer-
cise their right not to use Norplant. 32 Still, it is hard to make a convincing 
argument that offering poor women free Norplant, as well as bonuses to use it, 
leaves them worse off than if the program did not exist at all. These women 
are not forced to choose between starvation and Norplant use, but only be-
tween accepting the bonus and its condition, or not. Norplant bonus programs 
arguably increase poor women's reproductive options more than the laws 
denying abortion funding, which the Supreme Court upheld in Maher and 
McRae. 
III. T HE RESPONSE TO THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL C ONDITIONS D OCTRINE 
The concept of welfare entitlements, which welfare rights activists suc-
cessfully advocated in the 1960s and 1970s, is quickly eroding.33 Conserva-
tive politicians and resentful taxpayers disclaim ailY obligation to support 
welfare recipients' decision to have children. Legislators promote their contra-
ceptive welfare proposals in terms of savings to hard worldng citizens. For 
example, the sponsor of the Ka.ilsas bill offering cash bonuses for Norplant use 
claimed that, "[b]y any set of objective cri teria, the creation of the program 
has the potential to save the taxpayers millions of their hard-earned dollars ."34 
The response to the unconstitutional conditions claim, then, is likely to be, 
"sure, poor women have a right to make reproductive d:::cisions, but why 
should I have to pay for them?"35 
31. See Lynn A. Baker, The Price of Rights: Toward a Positive Th eory of Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 11 85 (1990) (presenting a pos iti ve theory of unconstitutional 
conditions that "asks whether the effect of the challenged condition is to require persons unable to 
earn a subsistence income, and otherwise eligible for the pertinent bene[i t, to pay a higher price to 
engage in that consti tutiona ily protected activity than similarly situated persons e 2.ming a subsis-
tence income"). 
32. See Coale , supra note 3, at 21 4 (proposing a rule "l imiting states to the power to selec-
tively reimburse a percentage of the marke t p1ice of Norplant"); see also John R. Hand, Note, 
Buying Fertiliry: The Constitutionaliry of Welfare Bonuses for Welfare iHothers Who Submit to 
Ncrplant Insertion, 46 VAND. L. REV. 715 , 71 9-20 (1 993) (presenting iUl " ideal" unconstitutional 
conditions argument against Norp lam bonuses, but predicting that it is likely to fai l) . 
33. The proposed Personal Responsibility Act replaces federa l entitlements to A_.-c:Dc and 
other welfa"-::: progr<Uns ·-.v ith block grants to the st<Hes. Elizabet..'J Shogren, H ome OKs Welfare 
Overh.a.ul Tho.r Cuts Off Aid Gua1ail!ees , L.A . TJMES , Mar . 25, 1995, 0.t A 1. 
34. Tc.n1 ar Lev/in , A. Plan to Pny ~ie!jtJ.rc J14others for BiTth CentraL, f·LY. T:!iVjES~ Feb. 9, 
i99 l , 3.t r\9 . 
35. Rol and Corning, the z~uthor of Wlt South Co_rvlizta bill nla_ndating l\Jorp1ant insenjon ~ 
express::d th is seniirnent on national t~;i cvision: "They can have ell the ch.l ldren they waJJ t. They 
jt: st have to pay for them ." Prirnetirne. Live: End of lnit.c cence (f\.BC te ltvi ::iio n broadcast, Sept. 9 , 
1993), avai lable in LEXIS, Nev1s Librarj~ Script File. He axgued tha~ his bill, if enacted, \-·,.,;ou ld 
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As these comments reveal, many legislators and their constituents will 
have a hard time seeing contraceptive welfare laws as exacting from women 
on welfare a higher price for exercising their rights. In their mind the propos-
als do not charge poor women for having children; they simply decline to 
subsidize this activity. Thus, although some contraceptive welfare measures 
may in one sense affirmatively impose a deterrent "above and beyond those 
economic deterrents that are a natural concomitant of a market economy,"36 
their proponents see them as replacing the constraints on poor women's repro-
ductive decisions that would exist but for the state's generosity. The unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine cannot adequately explain why the state should 
nevertheless support the private decisions of welfare recipients. 
IV. WHAT'S WRONG WlTH THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 
A. The Doctrine's Functions 
By asserting the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, claimants accept the 
premise that the government is under no obligation to subsidize poor women's 
reproductive decisions. They must renounce any claim to redistribution of 
resources necessary for reproductive liberty. The briefs of litigants who use 
the doctrine as a shield against government regulation begin with the partial 
surrender, "of course, we would never suggest that the government is affirma-
tively required to give us any support at all."37 This concession explains the 
need for the doctrine. 
The unconstitu tional conditions doctrine serves as a method for identifying 
"a characteristic technique by which the government appears not to, but in fact 
does burden ... liberties."33 It is needed only to explain how a government 
condition on f-unding could possibly be unconstitutional when the government 
has no obligation to provide funding in the first place. If the government may 
constitutionally deny the gro.nt altogether, why should recipients be heard to 
complain about a restriction? The doctrine reveals that, despite the logic of 
this question, the govemment nevertheless may be violating a constitutional 
right. Thus, under the prevalent understanding of privacy rights, the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine appears to be an indispensable first step of argu-
ments challenging the constitu tionality of contraceptive welfare lavvs.19 
- ---------· 
save taxpayers in hi s state $36 milli on in welfare '.U1d medical costs in L~e first year. i d. 
36. Ba..i<er, supr•-' note 31, at 1219. 
37. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 1 i, R ust v . Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No. 89-1391) 
("No one has a ;ight to a subsidy for the ex-ercise of rights to speech a..'ld privacy. "); Brief of the 
Commornvealth of t·il9ssachnsetts, the Center for Constitutional R ights et al. as A1nici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 14, R!~si, 500 U.S. 173 (Nos . 89-1391 , 89-1392) ("[A]mici do not suggest 
I:J~ at ule gov -=r-r._i11en~ is 2fftrrn aLiveiy I"equired to provide \·;omen v;ith information reg8sding u~eir 
post-pregnc~ncy reproci.t.~c ti ·'Je op t~ ons . "). 
33. K.athlet;n I'tl. Su1liv?.D, Uncon..,.~n·tt~! ional Cc,ldilicns, l 02 i~I.ARV . L. REV. 1413 , 1419 
( 1989). 
39. Thi~; i~ vy-} ~ y -~·; .:: ] fan:: r~ g~1t·:. s.c~ v nc:rJ.i,:; s r:~c,y b:; r:;:!L·;ctzmt ta r:.:pudi?.te rJ1e l.l:Iccnstit~Jtiona! 
cond itior1s doctrine . ~-1/iti~ou !: l ~, ;}ley rn ay ~ot c:v::n t; .:: ~.ble to a.r ticul<1te 2. r:constit:itional vioia t\on 
\vhen t.he ge·1ernn1·::rn conc!idon:.-: · ...-.... ~.<lt.:l.l";"; 'c,enefit ::: . l concur ~ n Fre derick Sch ~iuer's iJis v/ thci.t the 
unconstirn ~i ·'Jr::B.l co~~d i t !c::J.s d.ccr:r-=tr<: se:·ves cnly thi ;::. iirnl "L :::d purpcse and ds-·,;s no:~ S i . ( :J~Y.) !t :::l grand-
:::.,.. thccn~-1 of 2.na l y:~i s . S::.:-=: _;-::;-rtdcricl·: . .-~ c h~~u.::r. Teo I-lntd: Lh~ccnsiin~rionc-.l c:():: -~.-! i t iott.s ai-;.d Th? 
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine functions like a pair of eyeglasses 
that enables us to see the infringement of liberty obscured by our faulty con-
stitutional vision. Why do we need this corrective device in order to under-
stand the harm of requiring poor women to use Norplant in order to survive? 
If the government were required to subsidize the activities at issue, and if 
reliance on public assistance therefore did not constitute a waiver of privacy, 
there would be no place for a special doctrine to prohibit government condi-
tions that threaten these activities. It is our inability to defend poor women 's 
reproductive liberty in terms of traditional constitutional discourse that forces 
us the rely on this weak-kneed doctrine. Moreover, because the doctrine focus-
ses on the violation of individual rights, rather than on the government's con-
ditional spending as a system of power, it often permits individuals to barter 
away their rights in exchange for benefits. 40 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine also functions like a bandage to 
patch up the gaping hole in our constitutional framework designed to protect 
the liberties of economically independent citizens. The unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine is conceived as a way of preserving, within the baseline of 
present economic inequality, "spheres of private ordering from government 
domination. "41 It maintains the boundary between the private realm and state 
power stemming from the government's largesse. (This is part of the overall 
liberal project of preserving a sphere of individual privacy from government 
interference.) The unconstitutional conditions doctrine tries to fill the gap, 
created by the dependence of the poor, in the theory that "[a] right to private 
property, free from government interference, is . . . a necessary basis for a 
democracy."42 It gives to propertyless citizens a dollop of the protection ordi-
Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 989 (1995). Nevertheless, I argue 
that the doctrine obscures more constitutional violation than it illuminates. Professor Schauer 
suggested to me at the symposium that the difference in our views of the doctrine may lie in the 
plausible reach of judicial power. Schauer believes that judges are constrained to act within the 
limits of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, while I advocate that judges apply a more posi-
tive understanding of rights. 
40. See MARTHA A. FlNEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 185 (1995). Thomas Merrill notes that, according to this view 
of rights, "a doctrine that forbids individuals to sell their constitutional rights smacks of paternal-
ism, and seems to deny the moral autonomy of the individual." Merrill, supra note I, at 869 (ad-
vocating a model of constitutional rights as public goods that rejects their conception as valuable 
entitlements belonging to individuals); see also Marion Smiley, Private Lives and Public Welfare: 
A Critical Reconstruction of the Concept of State Paternalism· 8 (unpublished manuscript on file 
with au thor) (criticizing the definition of state paternalism as a violation of individual liberty) . 
41. · Sullivan, supra note 38, at 1506; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Un constitutional Conditions and 
the Distribution of Liberty, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 327, 330 (1989); see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Why the Unconstiturional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (wilh Particular Reference to 
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv . 593, 601 (1990) ("[T]he current constitutional 
mainstream[] sees L'Je unconstitutional conditions doctrine as an effort to preserve legal require-
ments of governmental neutrality under different social and economic conditions."). Another way 
of putting it is that the doctrine sets a limit on economic inequality by prohibiting the 
government's power to impose a surcharge on the poor for exercising their constitutional rights. 
Professor Ba..~er argues that the core of the doctrine's consistency in the context of public assis-
tance lies in "the Court's tacit attempt to ensure a certain non-wealth-dependent equality of consti-
tutional rights within the constraints of our market economy." Baker, supra note 31, at 11 88. 
42. Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 907, 9 15 
(1993). 
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narily provided by ownership of private property so that they may, in a limited 
way, belong to the democratic polity. As Cass Sunstein explains, 
the creation of property rights should be seen as an unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine writ very large. The idea is that government may 
not use its power over property to pressure rights in general; the 
existence of property rights generates a strong barrier against this 
form of pressure, just as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
provides a degree of insulation in narrower settings.43 
Sunstein 's comparison helpfully highlights the relationship between prop-
erty, liberty, and unconstitutional conditions, but I would stress even more 
than Sunstein the inferiority of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to 
property rights. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine tries to squeeze the 
propertyless into a constitutional framework designed to include only property 
owners. 
In short, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine accepts the current un-
equal distribution of wealth, as well as the view of liberty as protection against 
state interference in that unequal arrangement.44 It attempts to minimize the 
harm to those who fall at the bottom (or completely out of bounds), without 
changing the basic order of things. 
B. The Doctrine's Paradox 
This view of unconstitutional conditions is paradoxical because it seeks to 
immunize a privaie sphere from state interference while at the same time 
requesting public assistance. It seeks to disconnect the demand for privacy 
from government intrusion and the demand for government intervention 
through financial support. It relies on the liberal resistance to government 
while hoping for the illiberal assistance of government. In order to determine 
the constitutionality of the condition, the doctrine requires us to close our eyes 
for a moment and pretend that poor women are not dependent on government 
assistance; then ~we may open our eyes the next moment and plead for govern-
n1ent support for their decision to have children.45 
43 . Jd.at916. 
44. Sunstein notes that his defense of property 1ights is not inconsistent wiLlJ redistributive 
programs. See id. at 91 7 (proposing redistributive programs designed "to bring about at least 
rough equali iy of opportunity a;1d, even more important, freedom from desperate conditions, or 
from circumstam:c:s lhat imJ:,-ode basic human functioning"); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 
l33-40 (aiso proposing redistributive programs). The unconstitutiona l conditions doctrine, howev-
er, serves to ave>id Lhe need for such redistribution. For an argument that the Framers ' view of 
~; l·operty , upon \vhich Sunstein relies, would justify a more expa..11sive redistribu tion of v;ealth than 
.:.;unstein propo:;e,., ~ee Wi lli arn E. Forbath, Why !s This Rights Talk Different from Ail Other 
Righ!s Talk? D·emcring ihe Cmm and Reimagining the Constitution , 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1788 
4 ). ~,:h-~j,Jn Strri ~ey :1nte:; a similar dilernrna posed by u~e libertosian approach to state pater-
.~: 2.l ~ s tn-the ~i t':Hc ~;; rr1aking of pr::rsonaJ choices fo~ individuals. Srndey argues that Ule concept cf 
.'ti.lte pat~rnaii:;m ;:,sa violation of a..r1 individual 's r!ght to free choic~ in rhe private sphere fo;-cr::s 
lJS to choo:;c be t' ·:~eei! accepting st:He p3ten1alisrn in the interests of providing we1fru·e and letting 
~ndi v i~ur.! ~S St\ff':.:;J- }n the in.~en~sts of preserving their nutonomy. See S!nil ey, su,t:ro. note 40, at 5. 
I 
I 
I 
1995] THE ONLY GOOD POOR WOMAN 941 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine inevitably cmmbles as a device 
for maintaining the boundaries between private and public spheres because it 
fails to justify the affirmative demand for public support for private decisions. 
This does not mean that making these private and public demands is necessari-
ly inconsistent. My point is that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does 
not help us to reconcile them. The growing conservative assaul t on welfare 
spending may finally compel us to abandon the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine in this context and confront directly the social and political implica-
tions of citizens' reliance on government welfare. Instead of seeking indeter-
minate answers through unconstitutional conditions analysis, we would inquire 
directly into the substantive constitutional values at issue-the boundaries of 
women's right to reproductive autonomy and of poor citizens' right to partici-
pate in the political community. 
C. Dependence as a Waiver of Privacy 
Because the unconstitutional conditions doctrine maintains the liberal 
boundary between public and private realms, it fails even to address most 
government interference in the private lives of welfare recipients. The sphere 
of privacy protected by liberal rights largely evaporates once the individual 
invites in state assistance. An individual's acceptance of government benefits 
is deemed to constih1te a waiver of privacy. The Court has routinely allowed 
the state to regulate poor families by conditioning benefits on conformance to 
various mandates. Since families are not entitled to government support, the 
Court reasons, the government may force them to break up, rearrange, shriP~lc 
and open up for inspection in order to qualify for benefits.46 Although the 
Court might find an egregious invasion of poor families' privacy to be uncon-
stitutional, most of the day-to-day decisions of family life remain vulnerable to 
state regulation.47 This use of the government ' s spending power to supervise 
the everyday lives of poor fami lies is not even analyzable as an unconstitu-
tional conditions problem because the government has not interfered with any 
constitutionally protected activity by the recipients.43 
This loss of ptivacy often entails state intrusion in welfare recipients' 
reproductive decisionmaking. From the inception of welfare programs in 
America, states conditioned payments on mothers' compliance with standards 
of sexual and reproductive behavior. 49 The Social Security Act, for example, 
46. See Lucy Billings, The Choice Between Living with Family }rfembers and Eligibility for 
Government Benefits Based on Need: A Constitutional Dilemma, 1986 UTAl-1 L. REV. 695; Mi-
chael S. Wald, State lniervention on Belwlf of "Neg lected" Chiidrer. : Standards for Removal of 
Children from Th eir Homes, .i'vfonitoring the Sia tv.s of Children in Foster Care, and Termina tion 
of Parentai Rights, 28 STAN . L. REV. 623 (1976); see aiso Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 
(1987) (upholding AFDC regulation de termining families' eligibili ty for benefits despite its nega-
tive effects on families' chosw living arrangements); LyEg v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (re-
jecting constitu tional challenge to a provision in federal Food Stamps program L}Jat determined 
eligibility based on households); Wyrna:1 v. James, 4DO U.S . 309 ( 197!) (rejecting wel far;-; 
mother's right to resist st.ae horne inspection as a condition of we lfare eligibili ty). 
47. S;ce FlNE:'vlA.N, :.uprc r1ote 40, at 185 . 
48. See Lynn A. B2J<er, Bargaining for Public Assistance, 72 DEN'/. U. L. REV. 949 (i995). 
49 . For his torical accounts of we lfare poiicy's regu iatjon of women a.nd their farnil ie:; . see 
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allowed states to condition eligibility for Aid to Dependent Children upon 
mothers ' sexual morality through suitable-home or "man-in-the-house" 
rules.50 More recently, women on welfare have been required, as a condition 
of receiving benefits, to undergo mandatory paternity proceedings that include 
state scrutiny of their intimate lives.5 ' Under the Family Support Act of 1988, 
the states are required to meet federal standards to establish the paternity of 
children born out of wedlock as a means of procuring child support from the 
absent fathers.52 The House Republicans' Personal Responsibility Act con-
tains more coercive measures: it denies AFDC benefits for a child whose pa-
ternity has not been established and directs states to warn unmarried pregnant 
women of their ineligibility for state aid unless they cooperate in establishing 
the child ' s paternity.53 
In her recent book, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other 
Twentieth Century Tragedies, Martha Fineman argues that the law confers 
privacy only on the "traditional" family, composed of a husband, a wife , and 
their children.54 Privacy doctrine does not shield from state intrusion single 
mothers, including women who have children outside of marriage and di-
vorced mothers: 
If nonintervention is the norm, bureaucratic decisions are burdened, 
and the institution of family can be set up practically and theoretically 
as a construct to mediate against the power of the state. The private 
family enjoys the noninterventionist norm; the expectations and 
claims these favored units have vis-a-vis the larger society are un-
available to single mother families.55 
Fineman also notes that "private" traditional families receive huge public 
subsidies through government and other programs, such as tax breaks, govern-
ment-backed mortgages, and employer-subsidized health and life insurance.56 
Unlike "public" families, however, their reliance on government support does 
not entai l a loss of privacy. Although Fineman is correct that the denial of 
MIMI ABROMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLO-
NIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1988); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BlJT NOT ENT:TLED: SINGLE MOTH-
ERS AND THE HISTOR Y OF WELFARE ( 1994). 
50. Lucy A. Williams, The Ide ology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform 
Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 7 19, 723-24 (1992). 
5 1. FINEMAN, supra note 40, at 186; see Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 39 1 (1975) (approving 
requirement of we lfare mothers' ass istance in paternity actions) ; Allen v. Eichler, No. 89A-FE-4, 
1990 WL 58223 (De l. Super. Ct. 1990) (order denying benefi ts to a woman who refused to submit 
a calendar on which she had allegedl y written the names of her sexual partners). 
52. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343, 2344 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S .C.). 
53 . Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 8, §§ 101 , 103. 
54. FINEMAN, supra note 40, at 177-93 . 
55. !d. at 180; see also Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family , 1979 SUP. CT. REv. 
329, 339-<lc() (noting that the Court 's protection of parental decisionm aking depends on parents' 
success "in bringing obedient social conformance from their children") ; Martha Minow, Th e Free 
Exercise of Families, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 925, 944 ("The state can defend many burdens on 
ind ividual choice in the name of a state interest in preserv ing or supporting the ' tradit ional' fami-
ly ."). 
56. FiNEMAN, supra note 40, at 19 1; see also GORDON, supra note 49, at 1-1 3 (describing 
'.he stratification of the United States we lfa re system). 
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single mothers' privacy is based on patriarchal definitions of family, it is also 
true that dependence on government aid provides an additional rationale, as 
well as the opportunity, for state regulation.57 Wealth can help to buy the 
presumption of privacy. 
V. WHAT'S WRONG WITH GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON PROCREATION? 
An alternative approach to government's conditional spending focusses on 
its systemic political impact instead of its infringement of individual women's 
(waivable) rights.58 We might examine how this use of government largesse 
perpetuates unjust relationships of power in our society. Contraceptive welfare 
laws degrade the dignity and equal status of poor citizens. This political di-
mension is revealed by comparing welfare proposals with eugenic policies that 
proliferated in America during the first half of the twentieth century.59 Con-
traceptive welfare laws do not implement eugenic policy; they do not seek to 
improve the nation's stock through genetic selection. Nevertheless, we can 
understand the injustice of conditioning welfare on relinquishing reproductive 
autonomy by examining what these proposals share in common with eugenic 
programs. 
The salient feature of both eugenic sterilization laws and contraceptive 
welfare proposals is their imposition of society's restrictive norms of procre-
ation . Denying someone the right to bear children deprives her of a basic part 
of her humanity; it constitutes a denial of her human dignity and equal status 
in society.60 It is grounded on the premise that people who depart from social 
norms do not deserve to procreate. Carrie Buck, the nineteen-year-old whose 
involuntary steri lization was held constitutional by the Uni ted States Supreme 
Court,61 was punished by sterilization not because of any mental disabili ty, 
but because of her deviance from society's social and sexual norms. 62 Indeed, 
the state ' s reasons for sterilizing Carrie Buck in 1921..1.-----because she ·was poor 
57. I disc uss elsewhere how racism interacts wiu'l patriarchy in limiting th::: privacy of poor, 
single mothers. See Dorothy E . Robert.s, Racism and Patriarchy in the !vieaning of lv!otherhood, in 
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST T!-:.'EORY AND THE L EGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 224 (Mar-
tha A. Fineman & Isabelle Karpin eds., 1995). I note that " G'le Sta[.~ has always considered Black 
mothers, whether married or single, to need public superv ision and not to be entitled to privacy. 
Thus, the 'public ' single mother has ne·ier had a Black counterpart in the ' private ' family." !d. at 
248 n.6. 
58. Kathleen Sullivan's interpret2.ti on of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a tech-
nique for contesting the "systemic effect of conditions on distribution of righLc; in the poli ty as a 
whole" offers another systemic approach to conditional governmen t spending. She describes one 
invidious effect as the creation of a constitutional caste as a resul t of discrimi;,ating among right-
holders on the bas is of their relative dependency on a government benefit. See Suilivan, supta 
note 38, at l '-~21 , l ~·89-99 . 
59. See genzrally TviARX I-1. ~-L\LLER, EUGENI CS: I-lEr<.EDIT, .. \ R lPJ'-! }\ TflTUDES IN A.NfERlCAN 
THOUGHT ( 1963); REILLY, supra note 17 (discussing involunwr y sterilizc.Licn). 
60. Dorolhy E. P. .. oberts~ Punish ~·ng D n,!g /·\.ddic!s ~!Vha Have B~..1bies: V!on-zen of Co!or, 
Equality and the Right ofPri·,}acy , 104 i-IAR;I . L. R E·v·. 1419 , 1472 (199 1). 
61. See Bur:::c v. Bell, 27 t.~ U.S. 100 (1 927). 
62 . See Stephen J. Gould , C'arric Sue/( s Daught.r: ;··~ 2 Cor~ JsT . :·=o ~,..I r-r ;E:·.J"T,-\1~ -~-- 331 , 336 (1935) 
('"Heo.· cuse n;:: v .~ r ·-;;:a:;; .::bout rncnt.al :-1-::fici;:ncy; i·~ \'..'as .': \} ~ ?/ 3y s a C t2.t . ..:: r o"f s:;;;(ual tL:Jrality a.nd 
social dev i ~nce . . .. 'T\vo ge!lerc.;.t.l0ns Gf b~sl.Brds ?Je C1i cugh .':) . 
944 DENVER UNIVERSITY LA VI REVIEW [Vol. 72:4 
and had become pregnant out of wedlock-were precisely the same as the 
state's reasons for enacting contraceptive welfare laws today.63 
Eugenicists framed their arguments not only in terms of improving the 
race, but also in terms of reducing the cost of subsidizing the unfit. In his 
celebrated study of a degenerate family, The Jukes, R.ichard L. Dugdale in-
cluded detailed calculations of the amounts the Jukes had cost New York state 
by 1877. He estimated the family's financial burden to society at 
over a million and a quarter dollars of loss in 75 years, caused by a 
single family 1,200 strong, without reckoning the cash paid for whis-
key, or taking into account the entailments of pauperism and crime of 
the survivors in succeeding generations, and the incurable disease, 
idiocy, and insanity growing out of this debauchery, and reaching 
further than we can calculate.64 
Later, the country's leading eugenicist, Charles Davenport, asserted, 
[i]t is a reproach to our intelligence that we as a people, proud in 
other respects of our control of nature, should have to support about 
half a million insane, feeble-minded, epileptic, blind and deaf, 80,000 
prisoners and 100,000 paupers at a cost of over 100 million dollars 
per year.65 
Government control of reproduction in the name of science, social policy, 
or fiscal restraint masks racist and classist judgments about who deserves to 
bear children. The contraceptive welfare proposals implement a belief that 
poor people, especially Blacks, are less entitled to be parents. The debate 
about Norplant and welfare was initiated by an editorial in the Philadelphia 
Inquirer that proposed Norplant as a solution for the high poverty rate of 
Black children.66 After the public outcry, which led to a printed apology ,67 
few policy makers have explicitly directed their proposals at Black women. 68 
Yet welfare reform remains closely tied to racial politics. Although most 
families who receive Ai=<VC are not Black, Black women disproportionately 
re ly on this form of government aid to support their children.69 
63. See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 
N.Y.U. L. R EV. 30, 51 (1985). 
64. RICHARD L. DUGDALE, THE JUKES 167 (1891). 
65. CHARLES B. DAVENPORT, HEREDITY IN RELATION TO EUGEN1CS (1911). 
66. See Donald Kirnelman , Poverry and Norpiant: Can Contraception Reduce the 
Underc!ass, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 12, 1990, at A18. 
67. See An Apology: The Editorial on Norplant and Poverty Was Misguided and 
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Moreover, the American public associates welfare given to single mothers 
with the image of the mythical Black "welfare queen" or teenager who delib-
erately becomes pregnant in order to increase the amount of her monthly 
check.70 It is fair to say, then, that welfare policies designed to discourage 
childbearing wi ll disproportionately affect Black women and may be targeted 
at these very women. 
During the eugenic movement's heyday in America, many poor women 
were judged mentally deficient and were briefly institutionalized in order to 
undergo sterilization.71 A 1928 Wisconsin study of women who were dis-
charged after being sterilized in institutions for the feeble-minded found: 
"Many mentally deficient persons by consenting to the operation are permitted 
to return, under supervision, to society where they become self-supporting 
social units and acceptable citizens. Those inmates unwilling to consent to the 
operation remain segregated for social protection as well as individual wel-
fare."72 These poor women's social acceptability was contingent on their con-
sent to sterilization. Women who agreed to the procedure were rewarded with 
permission to enter society. Those who refused were punished with social 
segregation. 
This restriction on "feeble-minded" women's abil ity to participate in soci-
ety inflicts the same injury as the contraceptive welfare proposals. The harm 
of unconstitutional conditions is not to be found solely in the conditions they 
place on government benefits (seen as the violation of individual rights), but in 
the conditions they place on poor women's acceptability for citizenship. Poor 
women are entitled to the benefits of society only if they agree not to repro-
duce. According to these policies, an acceptable poor woman is one who con-
sents to use birth control: the only good poor woman is an infertile poor wom-
an. 
VI. EXPLAINING PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR "PRIVATE" DECISIONS 
If we reject the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the context of 
welfare, we are left to make an affirmati ve claim to public assistance for "pri -
vate" decisions. Such a claim is incomprehensible under current constitutional 
doctrine because of the barrier it has erected between public and private do-
mains. In order to claim government assistance, then, we must challenge this 
wall of constitutional thinking. 
Americans' resentment at paying for poor women's reproductive decisions 
stems from the particular unfairness associated with taxation for the purpose of 
providing public assistance to the poor, as well as with public support of pri-
OF ENTiTLEMENT PROGRAMS 1994 GREEN BOOi< 4-44 ( 1994); T eresa L. Arnett, Black Women and 
AFDC: il-fa!cing Entirlement Out of Necessity , in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 280 (Linda 
Gordon ed., 1990) . 
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.-\J"'D THE POLIT!CS OF EMPOWERMEl'-1! 77 (1991) ; Gwendolyn Mia~<. Welfare Reform in Historicai 
Perspecti ve, 26 CONN . L. REV. 879, 89 1-92 (199,~) . 
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vate matters.73 The law circumscribes property rights in a number of ways, 
and the government confiscates citizens' property in the form of taxes for a 
variety of purposes. Tax money even goes to many redistributive programs, 
such as social security, farm subsidies, and corporate bail outs. Nevertheless, 
citizens reserve a special condemnation for welfare that redistributes income to 
the poor. Lee Anne Fennell locates this unique sense of offense to property 
rights in welfare's violation of norms connecting property to work: 
This added element of distaste relates to the perceived unfairness of 
confiscating money-money by and large earned through work-for 
the purpose of providing an income to able-bodied, working-aged 
persons who have failed to earn their own living through work. It is a 
short step to the assertion that the more well-off are being forced to 
work for the benefit of others (and rather undeserving others, at that), 
at which point analogies to "forced labor" spring readily to mind.74 
This sentiment about welfare's unfairness has long been buttressed by the 
vilification of welfare recipients as undeserving and morally blameworthy.75 
Added to this source of unfairness is the view that public remedies should 
be reserved for publicly-caused problems; citizens must rely on private means 
to solve problems of their own making. If citizens request public assistance for 
private matters, according to this view, that assistance justifies state regulation 
of their private decisions . This is why receiving welfare is seen to deprive 
poor people of privacy. The critical foundation of this understanding of wel-
fare is the premise that both the poor and the nonpoor are responsible for their 
economic positions, that both poverty and property are derived from individual 
merit. 
Claims to public assistance for private decisions must refute this view of 
welfare's unfairness. Ti1ey might be based on notions of reparations for past 
injustice or collective responsibility for current inequalities. To begin with, our 
current mm:ket system benefits decently employed or otherwise wealthy citi-
zens at the expense of others who work for poverty wages or cannot find jobs. 
Free market capitalism , as well as American fiscal policy, guarantees that a 
portion of the population -yvill be unemployed at any given time. As Christo-
pher Jencks explained, 
America's economic history since 1945 suggests that we need what 
Marx called a "reserve al1ny of the unemployed." Without it, workers 
will push up their V/ages fas ter th2J1 their productivity, inflation will 
acceh:raw, and the Federal Reserve Board \Vill throw the economy 
into a recession in order to restore price sts.bility.76 
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This flaw in market economics was exacerbated by the transformation of 
the American economy after World War II that diminished the demand for 
blue-collar and unskilled workers and particularly marginalized Black work-
ers.77 Moreover, institutional barriers have prevented disempowered citizens 
from fully participating in the political process and the economy.78 As Loic 
Wacquant and William Julius Wilson conclude, "[t]he growth of welfare in the 
inner city is but a surface manifestation of deeper social-structural and eco-
nomic changes, including deindustrialization, skyrocketing rates of joblessness, 
the increasing concentration of poverty, and racial polarization."79 
Women are disadvantaged in the labor market by sex discrimination and 
by workplace rules that assume workers have no child care obligations.80 
Black single mothers-who make up a disproportionate share of the AFDC 
rolls- are frustrated by all of these structural impediments. While other indus-
trialized countries structure their markets and social programs to reduce pover-
ty and wage inequality, American social policies and legal rules actively en-
courage these conditions.81 
So far, these arguments refute the absolute rejection of public assistance 
for the poor as undeserved. But why should the state provide more than the 
minimal means of survival to needy citizens and why does the Constitution 
require this? It is beyond the scope of this essay on unconstitutional conditions 
to elaborate these redistributive constitutional arguments. I will suggest, how-
ever, two arguments elaborated by others that warrant further exploration and 
advocacy. 
First, we might replace the concept of privacy as a purely negative right 
with the concept of liberty as human flourishing that affinnatively guarantees 
the needs of human personhood.82 Guided by a substantive vision of human 
flourishing, this interpretation of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
requires the government to eliminate illegitimate social coercion based on race, 
gender, and class, as well as to provide the prerequisites for meaningful par-
vatives assume that unemployment much below 6 percent is an unacceptable risk"); see also Paul 
Davidson, Fighting Inflation Without Designated Paupers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1995 (letter to 
editor) (criticizing pol icies that "require a permanent army of unemployed paupers to achieve a 
prosperous, inflation-free economy"). 
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ticipation in the national cornmunity. According to Robin West, "[t]he goal is 
an affmnatively autonomous existence: a meaningfully flourishing, indepen-
dent, enriched individual life."83 
Second, claims to public assistar:ce might also be based on the require-
ments of democracy. A truly democratic society has the obligation to provide 
its members with the prerequisites of political partidpation.84 William 
Forbath, for example, draws upon an ideal of equality embodied in the Civil 
War Amendments "in which racial and econorn.jc justice are entwined."85 The 
Reconstruction-era radicals' solution to the problem that poverty poses for 
democracy was not the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, but redistribution 
of wealth and resources. According to Forbath, "they thought, in Akhil Amar's 
apt phrase, that 'property is such a good thing ... so constitutive, so essential 
for both individual and collective self-governance,' that 'every citizen should 
have some. " '86 Forbath finds historical support for a positive constitutional 
vision that offers more than state provision of the bare minimum necessary for 
subsistence. Instead of focusing on welfare entitlements, Forbath argues, every 
previous generation of reformers "sought more complex and autonomy-en-
hancing institutional reforms to secure the constitutional norms of decent live-
lihoods, independence, responsibility, and remunerative work. "87 
C ONCLUSION 
The unconstitu tional condi tions doc trine maintains the liberal connection 
between property and privacy and the liberal separation between public intru-
sion and private decisions. A progressive vision of economic and political 
justice challenges both . Th1s general vision leaves open a number of questions 
about the c!aim to government assistance. Should we see it as a right to gov-
ernment funding of pa..:i:icular activities, or to broad economic redistribution 
that ensures all citizens the property necessary for private autonomy and dem-
ocratic participation? Should we prefer universal programs that might garner 
broad -based support <U'ld blur distinctions between the poor and nonpoor or 
means-tested and race-based p;-ograms strategically directed at dismantling 
institutional inequali ties? Should v;e direct our efforts to the courts, legisla-
tures, or both? Moreover, establishing a collective obligation to support the 
prerequisites for ci. ;;mocracy or human fl ourishing will not necessat-ily deprive 
the gover:nrnent of 3.ny povver to regulate these. activities . But it '.Nill force the 
govem meni 1o justify its regulation on more kgitimai:e terms. There are nu-
merous tasks to p :Jr oth~ in constn.lct1ng ;:-, more dignified and egalitarian we1fare 
syste:rn. The lLC!con.::ti tntio:nal condi ti ons doctrine:, ho\vever) points us in the 
wTong direction. 
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